The Enlightenment, that’s trendy purpose, failed us partially, Hegel exhibits, each for the historical past it left behind and the legacy it bequeathed us. Certainly it introduced us and spirit to the level of self-destruction…
Editor’s Observe: This essay is a part of a collection devoted to Senior Contributor Dr. Eva Brann of St. John’s School, Annapolis, on this, the yr of her 90th birthday. This essay was initially given as a lecture at St. John’s School, Santa Fe on February three, 2016 and November three, 2017.
Hegel’s Reflections on the Enlightenment and the French Revolution
…and Their Different Legacy
(Or The Street to Hell is Paved with Unrealized Summary Universals)
“Liberté, equalité et fraternité, ou la mort.”
An early revolutionary banner
“…Subjective virtue…brings with it
the most fearful tyranny.”
Hegel, The Philosophy of Historical past
“Spirit demands particularity.”
Hegel, Philosophy of Proper
“There is nothing more unproductive
for the human being than an abstract idea.”
Tocqueville, Democracy in America
“Not only the reason of millennia—
their madness too breaks out in us.
It is dangerous to be an heir.”
“Even victory seems unable to substitute
stability for chaos, honesty for corruption,
authority and trust in government
for decay and disintegration.”
I’d like to start this night with an aphorism:
Considering and philosophy are good. Typically, nevertheless, we have now to consider how we expect,
about the sort of considering that engages us, and the penalties of the mode of conceptualization
we expect so revealing: for some mild is glare, some inspiration intoxicating, some perception
precipitous. Considering and philosophy are good, however ….
- Prologue in Historical past
By means of prologue, some common historic observations are so as or, one may say, causes to not conflate the American and French Revolutions, certainly causes to marvel about the latter
i. Historical past textbooks could be deceptive. The American and French revolutions are sometimes conflated. Nevertheless, ours was a conflict of liberation from overseas occupation (“The British are coming.”); theirs was a “civil war” (even when by no means known as such) displacing the present political and social order.
ii. Ours was not a revolution to determine democracy; we have been already democratic (Tocqueville). The French, against this, was a grand effort to plant a democratic authorities in monarchical soil. Ours was profitable; theirs was adopted by the Napoleonic Empire and many years upon many years of political instability.
iii. Furthermore, the commonplace Marxist interpretations is probably not satisfactory. Neither “economic” nor “class” battle merely explains the extraordinary character of occasions. a) There have been meals shortages at the time, however normally the revolution passed off throughout a 50 yr interval of financial progress (if with nice public debt). Extra importantly, economies have been worse in different nations the place no revolution passed off. b) Additionally many liberal the Aristocracy, avocats (legal professionals and civil servants) and clergy have been a part of the early reformers. The peasants, lots of whom had lately turn into landowners, have been late in becoming a member of the motion. Marx himself referred to as it a “bourgeois revolution.” 
iv. Regardless of their shared admiration for historic republics, the French revolutionaries didn’t study the similar classes that the American framers did from Greek and Roman historical past. Most prominently, the American framers discovered the want to put constitutional restraints on fashionable democracy.
v. For strategic causes towards the British, King Louis XVI was an early supporter of the American Revolution. He had already begun to undertake reforms (e.g. larger illustration). The revolutionaries, nevertheless, rejected gradual reform in favor of radical change (regardless of initially preserving the king on as a logo).
vi. Most revealing, a lot of the early in style resentment was towards the excessive centralization of authority by the king and the consequent displacement of regional authorities (the king’s intendants changed native authorities and disinvested the the Aristocracy). The French revolutionaries, nevertheless, continued this centralization of energy (the primacy of Paris and the Île de France) by way of a successive collection of elections by electors, if now in the identify of the individuals (“democratic centralism”/Jacobin dictatorship)
vii. The fall of the Bastille was largely symbolic. It housed solely seven prisoners at the time.
viii. The theorists of the French Revolution, the philosophes, needed to be unique. They rejected the English mannequin of a constitutional monarchy (1688) and the American mannequin of “representative government” and “balance and division of powers” (1776/1789). Briefly they rejected Montesquieu.
ix. The guillotine—amongst whose victims, by the approach, was Lavoisier—didn’t solely behead aristocrats and clergy. A considerable variety of these killed throughout the Reign of Terror weren’t nobles. Most astonishing of all, lots of the revolutionary leaders themselves met the similar destiny (Danton, St. Simply, and Robespierre).
x. However above all why the “Reign of Terror”? Why have been 20-40,000+ individuals guillotined? Why such extremes? The unique motto of the revolution was “liberté, equalité, fraternité ou la mort,” that’s “liberty, equality, fraternity, or death.”
All these observations increase the query how we’re to know the French Revolution as a singular occasion by itself, totally different in sort and motivation from ours. Hegel presents an interpretation.
2. Purpose and Violence
There’s a little part in his Phenomenology of Spirit that I want to name to your consideration, so little—9 out of 5 hundred plus pages—that it’s fairly potential that one won’t even discover it. It’s a transition stage, nevertheless, and thus, as in all Hegel, is important, to not be ignored. The part is entitled “Absolute Freedom and Terror” (Die absolute Freiheit und der Schrecken, [#582-563/355-363]) and seeks to articulate the religious transformation—the “inner revolution,” as Hegel referred to as it—underlying the historic occasion that got here to fruition in the French Revolution and therefore is a part of our collective inheritance.
However earlier than we begin, a couple of caveats: Talking about Hegel is, to say the least, very troublesome. a) For one, excerpting such a small part from out of the bigger entire dangers being grossly deceptive. It’s like taking a look at a small department of a really giant tree with out seeing the tree and with out seeing the department’s integration inside the entire. b) Furthermore, regardless of his abstruse conceptualization and forbidding language, Hegel seeks to discuss “the actual.” Each instances require a big dose of generosity on our half and no small effort to see that what he’s speaking about is our world, our historical past, the life through which we discover ourselves. It’s thus fairly attainable that a lot of what follows won’t be instantly intelligible (seniors suspect what I imply). However bear with me. The means could also be considerably grim, however the finish has its rewards: You might come away with questions you’ve not requested earlier than.
Further preliminaries: c) Maybe it goes with out saying that Hegel thinks in a different way than we do. “Ideas,” for Hegel, are by no means simply thought-entities, and certainly by no means “mere ideas.” Concepts are actual and have an goal vitality; they’re, he says, “forces” in the world. That is what Hegel means by “history.” Concepts, too, may be misguided, partial, atavistic, lose their connection to the actual, grow to be empty and take flight. That is what Hegel means by “unrealized abstractions.” d) Furthermore when he makes use of phrases akin to “understanding,” “reason,” “consciousness,” “self-consciousness,” “will” and so on., he’s talking of those not as psychic processes merely however as manifestations of the a lot bigger improvement of world spirit. e) Hegel additionally has the exasperating follow, particularly in the Phenomenology, of talking a few stage of improvement in its most philosophical, i.e. religious, implications irrespective of the textual content or historic occasion that gave expression to it (for instance, the Antigone part). And it’s usually acknowledged that the part “Absolute Freedom and Terror” addresses what Hegel referred to as “the greatest world event of our [that is, his] time [2x],” the French Revolution and its horrendous penalties. f) Unavoidably I do presume some familiarity with the historic occasions and with the Phenomenology. g) And lastly, as I work via this textual content I can’t say quote-unquote. You’ll know when it’s Hegel who’s talking. I’ll do my greatest to maintain us grounded.
Hegel’s particular thesis may be said merely: The conceptual and religious transformation that emerges in the mid-eighteenth century that we name the Enlightenment (Eclairissement / Aufklärung: clarification) leads each to the French Revolution and its Reign of Terror, that may be a sure sort of considering results in violence. So our concern this night will probably be to think about the connection between this new mode of considering—this “new idealism,” if you’ll—and violence and in addition to wonder if this mode of considering may someway nonetheless be with us.
three. The Enlightenment: Humanity Dehumanized:
On this part of the Phenomenology, spirit is at that early stage of Enlightenment the place it’s nonetheless understanding its (i.e. our) Cartesian inheritance (#578/352). It has not but absolutely realized, Hegel says, the foundational perception implicit in Descartes’ considering that “being and thought are the same” (#578/352) however stays at the intermediate stage the place the entire is lease asunder by “the vanity [i.e. self-importance] of understanding and self-will” (#572/348), that’s, we nonetheless see ourselves over towards and aside from an “external” world.
A step towards a fuller realization of this inheritance is to assume and reside in the world by way of the concept of utility, the place objects are considered instrumentally as helpful for ourselves. On this approach all issues are associated to us. Although consciousness doesn’t discover itself in possession of those instantly and thus falls in need of full identification, it but possesses them mediately as an finish towards which it strives. On this means the complete objectivity of the object is “withdrawn,” Hegel says, in that now all is assumed mediately by means of us. That is decisive and prepares the subsequent metamorphosis of spirit. Hegel says: “From this inner revolution there emerges the actual revolution of the actual world, the new shape of consciousness, absolute freedom” (#582/355-6) [2x].
A brand new form of consciousness? “Self-consciousness… [now] grasps the fact that its certainty of itself is [in some sense] the essence of all spiritual…spheres [classes, institutions, corporations, professions, social strata], of the real as well as the supersensible world.…’” In different phrases, the world and its social buildings are usually not seen as merely “other”—as externally “objective”—however at the moment are seen as intimately associated to us. “…All reality is [thus] spiritual,” Hegel says. At this second, spirit has come to understand that “the world is for it [consciousness] simply its own will and this is [as] a general will [2x]…the will of all individuals as such [taken together]…so that each is [now] undivided from the whole …” (584/ 356-7). Beforehand estranged, the will, now understood as extra encompassing, finds its id in a larger unification, a generalized “will.”
With this, we bear a serious transformation and self-development. Hegel describes this new approach of being in the world thus: “…Each individual consciousness raises itself out of its allotted sphere [class. profession etc.], [and] no longer finds its essence and its work in [any] particular sphere [or activity], but grasps itself [anew] as the concept of [a general] will, grasps all spheres as the essence of this [new, more fully realized, transpersonal] will, and [now] can only [properly] realize itself in a work which is the work of the whole….” [2x] Because of this “self-generalization,” so to talk, “…all social groups or classes…are [effectively] abolished [as other]; the individual self-consciousness that [heretofore] belonged to any such [particular] sphere, and willed and fulfilled itself [therein] has [now] put aside its [previously self-defining] limitation [namely, its particularity, its identity].” The outcome: “[consciousness’] purpose [has now become] the general purpose, its language [now becomes] universal law, its work universal work” [2x] (#585/357). The results of this transition: we’ve got develop into “generalized;” we have now develop into “universal consciousness.”
Let’s take into consideration this transition. The conventional individual together with his or her specific expertise is, Hegel says, “put aside.” “This [new] individual consciousness is no less directly conscious of itself as universal will,” he says, “it [now becomes] aware that its [proper] object is a [general] ‘law’ given by that [general] will and a work accomplished by it [spirit as general will]; … [with the result that] in passing over into action and in creating objectivity, [individual consciousness] is doing nothing individual [2x] but carrying out the [general] laws and functions of the state” (#587/358). We hereby acknowledge our company as transpersonal, as an expression of a extra common will.
Acutely aware of itself as “universal” will? “Doing nothing individual”? Figuring out with, actually discovering one’s id in the political entire, the state? Particular person personhood is thus supplanted by common consciousness. Merely put: Fred or Freda Jones (or at St. John’s, Mr. or Ms. Jones) has now grow to be Citizen [Citoyen] Jones (and subsequently World Citizen Jones). Whereas earlier than we’d have been involved with saving our “soul,” now we’re involved with saving our “nation,” or “humankind” (and subsequently “saving the planet”). Our correct work (“our own affairs”) is now thought principally to be common work (trendy internationalism/globalism).
To precise this in the clearest method, Hegel says, “universal freedom…would thereby be free from particular individuality” (#588/358) [2x]. Once we assume thus abstractly, we’re not our previous selves. We’re “free from” our private id, our human particularity. We take up the explanation for the common will. And therefore we’re nobody particularly. We’ve got develop into summary entities (“universal consciousness”) and stay on a fair larger aircraft of universality. This assent to common consciousness, based on Hegel, is the distinctive import of the Enlightenment and trendy freedom. However there are issues with this but underdeveloped notion of common consciousness.
four. The Paradox of Motion and “The Fury of Destruction”
Contemplate this curiosity: Whereas we’d assume in common phrases, we will solely act particularly methods. And this, Hegel says, is at cross functions with our basic (religious) aspirations. “Before the universal [as agent] can perform [any particular] deed,” he says, “[spirit] must [first] concentrate [locate] itself into the One of individuality… [that is in] an [actual] individual self-consciousness; for the universal will is only an actual will in a self [as agent]…” [2x]. One individually takes upon oneself the common intention thus isolating the locus of company in oneself. In so doing, in being embodied in a single actor, Hegel says, “…all other individuals are [as such] excluded from the entirety of this [its] deed…so that the deed would not be a deed of the [some] actual universal self-consciousness” per se [2x]. Spirit doesn’t act on its personal right here; it acts via people. But in doing so, one is not “undivided from the whole” and the “general will” is once more fractured.
The implications of this rupture are fairly disturbing, based on Hegel: “Universal freedom [as such], therefore, can produce neither a positive work nor a deed [because they are both always specific]; there is left for it [as universal] only negative action; it [universal freedom] is [therefore] merely the fury of destruction [Furie des Verschwindens (the fury of disappearing Brann, Rosen, Pinkard)]” [2x] (#589/359). Right here the common doesn’t act in its personal proper however by way of a universalized particular person. Any constructive motion that it might think about, nevertheless, is all the time one thing particular and therefore not merely common. Thus the solely [pure] universality out there to it’s “negative” motion. The solely motion out there to it’s to take away or destroy the circumstances of specific motion. Because of this Hegel says “universal freedom is merely the fury of destruction.” Briefly, whereas we might aspire to universality, we can’t attain past particularity besides to destroy it: trendy nihilism (anarchism).
This fracture is then spelled out additional: Spirit now “…divides itself into [two] [defective] extremes equally abstract” (on this case a nasty phrase for Hegel). On the one hand, he says, (1) it divides itself into “…a simple, inflexible cold universality,” on the different, (2) “…into the discrete, absolute hard reality and self-willed atomism of actual self-consciousness[es].” Having successfully “…completed the [total, revolutionary] destruction of the actual organization of the world”— and right here Hegel just isn’t being hyperbolic however has in thoughts for instance the destruction of the monarchy, the Aristocracy and clergy in France at the onset of the revolution—such an summary consciousness “…exists now just for itself,” he says, “that is [it is itself] its sole object, [though now] an object that no longer has any [specific] content, possession, existence or outer extension” to provide it any definition. [2x] This summary[ified] particular person (if that may be a phrase), Hegel says, “is merely this knowledge of itself as an absolutely pure and free [undelimited] individual self” (#590/359). “Absolutely pure [empty] and free individual self:” “All that remains…is its abstract existence as such,” a mere, content-less, predicate-less being-there.
Thus, having obliterated the world of particulars, it finds it has nothing left however its personal abstracted being-for-self in the most excessive types of “cold universality” or easy “self-willed atomism.” Trendy freedom, based on Hegel, thus takes two varieties: ideology (or humanly detached, chilly universality) and sheer willfulness (or “arbitrary,” indiscriminate will).
5. “With No More Significance than Cutting Off the Head of a Cabbage”
One may assume this image excessive, however how else to elucidate, Hegel wonders, how a revolution impressed by the highest human beliefs—by “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity” and by “The Rights of Man and Citizen”—impressed, one may need thought, by a love of 1’s nation and humanity—might but have led to the most dreadful, inhuman penalties? Hegel’s conclusion: the relationship between the revolution and its so-called “aftermath” just isn’t “contingent,” shouldn’t be unintentional. It’s, relatively, the vital end result of the transformation of thought at this stage of purpose. He thus concludes that “the sole work and deed of [this new mode of consciousness] universal [abstract] freedom is death.” Wow! The work of “universal freedom” is “death”? Allow us to take heed to the entire passage:
The sole [defining] work and deed of common freedom is subsequently dying, a dying…which has no internal significance [Umfang: scope, compass] …, for what’s negated is [nothing but] the empty level of the completely free self. It’s thus the coldest and meanest [baldest: quickest] of all deaths, with no extra significance than [that of] chopping off a head of cabbage [Kohlhaupt] or swallowing a mouthful of water (#590/360).
“The sole work of universal freedom is death?” Once more how can a perfect comparable to freedom—our cherished liberal ultimate—discover its expression or instantiation in what seems to be its reverse, in pure negation, in the elimination of the precise, in dying? And never simply dying, however a demise with out internal significance? We have now come to the stage the place “what is negated is [nothing but] the empty point of the absolutely free self.” [2x] And as we all know, some extent is “that which has no part” and is in some sense no factor. What’s negated, then, is not an individual as generally understood—with character, family members, household historical past, ethnicity, nationality, particular person accomplishments, and a smile—however, on this rarefied degree of consciousness, an abstraction, an empty level with no inside significance, a “free self,” briefly humanity dehumanized.
The picture Hegel calls to thoughts is unsettling: The mass elimination of such “point selves” is to be in comparison with the routine, banal, matter of reality “cutting off the heads of cabbages” for the soup of the day—his picture for the work of the guillotine. Our sense of the human is beheaded. However how have we gotten to the place the place individuals haven’t any extra significance than cabbages? Our considering modified. We modified.
What is probably much more shocking about this account is that the mass extermination that follows isn’t the results of ardour (no rampaging barbarian hordes besetting unsuspecting villagers). This outcomes somewhat from the very “progress of spirit” itself, from “the progress of reason” itself. We right here encounter a type of moments in the historical past of spirit the place the significance of a person human being is eclipsed, erased, certainly annihilated and this due to the imperfect strivings of cause. Thus the human seek for which means has led to a stage of human meaninglessness. What might have been thought to have had “absolute worth” worthy of salvation—a human soul, for instance—now not has inherent dignity. And this as a result of thought—not ardour—has but to mature, such that we take a life as we might take a sip of water.
With these pictures Hegel seeks to seize the frightful, transcendental impersonality of all of it: an detached, willful, “cold steel blade.” His paradoxical thesis: The Reign of Terror is the results of the progress of purpose; the Reign of Terror is the results of the Enlightenment.
6. The Political Significance of Summary Intelligence,
Revolutionary Consciousness (Ideology and Willfulness):
As well as, this stage of consciousness incorporates a harsh fact for governance. Hegel says: “In this flat, commonplace monosyllable [Tod: death] is contained the [new] wisdom of the government…” whereby “the abstract intelligence of the universal will” seeks to satisfy itself (#591/360). “The government [now becomes] nothing else but the [displaced] self-established focus, of the [newly transferred] individuality of the universal will.” Having itself misplaced its content material, the particular person self identifies with the bigger entire, the authorities or summary State. Having sought to free itself from the repressive common “the monarchy,” it now finds its id in a brand new “self,” the displaced universality “the [abstract] State.”
Add to this one other, merciless irony: Such a notion of presidency as itself the embodiment of the common might solely be misleadingly inclusive, misleadingly “universal” (misleadingly democratic), Hegel observes, for it “…excludes…other individuals from its act” (regardless of appearing in the identify of the common “the people”). In so doing the revolutionary authorities itself can’t however find yourself despotic, “opposed to the universal will.” Once more, one can assume universally, however one can solely act notably. “Consequently it is absolutely impossible for it [the new, revolutionary government] to exhibit itself as [i.e. to look as if it were] anything else but yet a[nother particular, political] faction.”
And in so doing it turns into in flip the sufferer of the very “logic” that introduced it into being. “…In the very fact of its being [yet another] faction,” Hegel say, “lies the direct necessity [in turn] of its [own] overthrow” because it now’s however one other “crime” towards the common. Briefly, what we took to be “the actual universal is only an unreal[ized] pure will, [and hence] a mere [or abstract] intention [Absicht: purpose].” Consequently, such summary revolutions are by nature (i.e. by Hegelian logic) unstable. The street to this hell, to the French Revolution, it will seem, is paved with unrealized “abstract universals.”
Furthermore, this leads in flip to a critical disharmony between “the unrealized universal” (the state) and people who had hoped to seek out their achievement therein (the individuals). The end result, in response to Hegel and historical past, can solely be infinite suspicion. “Being suspect… [now] takes the place, or has the significance and effect of being guilty.” Inasmuch as the internal intent of an individual can’t be discerned, any trace of reluctance seems seditious and responsible. The logic of such revolutionary consciousness thus runs: In case you are not with us, you’re towards us, and we don’t know in case you are with us. “The external reaction against this reality lies in the simple [unavailable] inwardness of intention [that one cannot penetrate]” and thus results in the essential “…cold, matter of fact annihilation of this existent [actual] self,” a self now a mere self “from which nothing can be taken away but its mere being,” for it has grow to be an “empty point,” a mere being-there. Thus the impersonality and indifference of the new common state to its personal so-called “citizens” (citoyens): empty factors, monads, conspirators, victims. Briefly, terror reigns.
The logic of revolutionary consciousness has lowered the human being to a “mere being”— a cabbage— the sense of otherness and insignificance predominates and results in suspicion and a way of expendableness. From the aspect of the “citizen”: terror; from the aspect of the state: accusation, abstract conviction and the chilly metal blade.
“In this its characteristic work [namely, death],” Hegel says, “absolute freedom becomes explicitly object[ive] to itself, and self-consciousness learns [to its horror] what absolute freedom in effect [truly] is. In itself [absolute freedom] is just this absolute self-consciousness, which effaces [i.e. annihilates] all distinction and all continuation [perpetuation] of distinction within it[self]. [2x] It is as such [in this way] that it is objective to itself; the terror [Schrecken] of death,” Hegel says, “is the [new] vision [Anschauung: image] of this negative nature to itself” (#592/360-1). Absolute freedom effaces all distinctions; summary freedom is however blind willfulness; existence is however a lived or felt negation; “terror of death” the new face of humanity..
Of equal significance is one additional implication, to not be ignored: “The universal will… [here] heightened [gesteigerte: risen] to the level of pure thought or abstract matter,” Hegel says, “changes round into its negative nature and shows itself [on the other side] to be equally that which puts an end [also] to the thinking of oneself, or to self-consciousness” (#592/361) [2x]. “Puts an end to the thinking of oneself?” From the aspect of the “point self,” the common will obliterates not solely “all distinctions” aside from itself however now additionally all distinctions inside itself. So excessive is the “logic of reason” right here, so radical, so “absolute,” so “pure,” that it in impact “puts an end [even] to [its own] self-consciousness,” Hegel says, that’s results in a self-obliterating, unarticulated empty oneness, a homogeneity of nothing particularly.
The revolution is now complete, the obliteration not simply “external” however “internal” as nicely. Thus, the different aspect of the religious revolution: humanity dehumanized.
Considering and philosophy are good, however ….
7. However Human Beings Can’t Reside Like That
Such is the logic of revolutionary considering. However human beings—even such summary human beings akin to we had grow to be—Hegel now acknowledges, can’t stay like this. If we can’t be at residence in the “revolutionary, abstract state,” nor at house with our alienated, decreased “point selves,” then the place are we to seek out our house? “These individuals who have felt the fear of death, …their absolute master,” he says, “[once] again submit to negation and distinction, [re-] arrange themselves [once again] in the various [social and political] spheres, return to an apportioned and limited task, [and] thereby [return] to their substantial reality” (#593/361). By way of the worry of dying we come to comprehend that our conceptual aspirations had distorted our human actuality. The fact is that we can’t reside as “unrealized, abstract universals.” We thus retreat from the summary and lethal common and discover “our substantial reality” as soon as once more in “an apportioned and limited task.” By means of the worry of demise we now revert (partially) to who we as soon as have been and recommit ourselves to a specific world.
This return to a specific world, nevertheless, may seem like a serious step backwards in “the progress of spirit,” may appear to be an inauthentic retreat to conference, custom, tradition, briefly to particularity. “Out of this tumult,” Hegel says, “spirit would [seem to] be thrown back to its original starting point, to the [earlier] ethical and real world of [Greek] culture, which would [seem to] have been merely refreshed and rejuvenated by the fear of the lord and master [death], which has again entered man’s hearts. [With the result that it would seem that] spirit would have to traverse anew and continually repeat this cycle of necessity [die Kreislauf der Notwendigkeit: circuit]…” (#594/361-2).
One step ahead and two steps again? Are we beginning over once more? And if we’re regularly thrown again to the starting, is there then no actual “progress of spirit”? Hegel’s response to the prospect of continuous repetition and return—and thus to the potential phantasm of progress—is that the [race] course of spirit—the “circuit of necessity”—is just not closed, no less than not at this level. And, he provides, this may be so provided that “…the result were only the complete [re-]interpenetration of self-consciousness and substance” (#594/361-2). That’s, at this level such a return is untimely. It might briefly resolve our alienation (the subject-object dichotomy) however it might not result in our true future, spirit’s final finish.
eight. “In Place of the Self…”
It’s true, Hegel continues, that at this stage “in the world of culture itself, [consciousness] does not get as far as to behold its [own] negation or alienation in the form of pure abstraction [that is, it hasn’t yet become explicit to itself]; on the contrary, its negation [emptiness] is [now] filled with a [transitional] content. It [re-]invests itself in several prior shapes, either [a] honor or wealth, which it gains in place of the self that it has alienated from itself, or [b] the [unperfected] language of spirit… which the disrupted consciousness acquires; or [c] the heaven of faith, or [d] the [earlier] utility of enlightenment” (#594/362).
“In place of the self that it has alienated from itself,” consciousness now unselfconsciously (that’s, unknowingly) finds refuge in time examined, prepared handy, although now unfulfilling, types of being: honor, cash, faith, utility, and “the language of spirit which the disrupted consciousness acquires” (extra about this final later). These function waystations, so to talk, till it grows into its subsequent form. As such, they show to be no true refuge. The deeper actuality for such an intermediate, “disrupted consciousness” stays, in accordance with Hegel, nonetheless unfavorable: “…All these [prior] determinations have vanished in the loss suffered by the self in absolute freedom” [2x] (#594/362), that’s, regardless of its momentary refuge, its actuality stays “the death that is without meaning” (or a way of radical contingency or finitude), “the terror of the negative” (or Angst) and that “nothing fills it with [true] content” (or anomie, estrangement, inauthenticity). There isn’t a going again. Previous types not serve.
Regardless of this sense of loss—that the current actuality is just not but our fullest risk—Hegel makes the exceptional but attribute declare that consciousness continues to be not at a complete loss however one way or the other but “…knows that [universal] will to be itself, and [thus] knows itself to be [more than its present imperfect stage, rather] knows itself to be essential being …” (if not but absolutely actualized and articulated). The end result then just isn’t wholly unfavorable. There’s a “determinate negation” to be realized right here. Its realization is two-sided: whereas spirit by some means is aware of that it’s “universal will,” it has right here discovered particularly that this isn’t to be present in “[will as] revolutionary government,” nor as “anarchy striving to establish anarchy,” nor itself “as the center of faction” (#594/363). Briefly, it has discovered that its achievement is to not be present in revolution, nor anarchy (nihilism), nor political absolutism. Revolutionary consciousness just isn’t our ultimate finish.
Thus regardless of consciousness’ failure in the foregoing—actually regardless of its falling brief in every of the many prior levels—it someway but is aware of that its future lies elsewhere. With this Hegel says: “Absolute freedom has thus [thereby in principle] removed the antithesis between the universal and the individual will…”—that’s the particular person has realized that it has grow to be and is someway common—“… [and] so does absolute freedom [now] leave [behind] its self-destroying [revolutionary] reality and pass over into another land of self-conscious spirit” (#595/363). As an acorn is aware of that it’s an oak tree, so spirit is aware of that it’s greater than its current state of incomplete improvement. “Absolute freedom leaves its self-destroying reality and passes into another land of self-conscious spirit” (#595/363).
Spirit is thus saved from tragedy, or a historical past of perpetual disappointment. Spirit was solely momentarily in retrograde, then. Although at this stage it might be troublesome for us to see the way it may but get past its embedded predicament—spirit all the time works “behind our backs”—it finds its method, purified of its hyper-generalized, damaging political ambitions, to a better transcendence and comfort in a brand new stage of universality, “Moral Spirit” (the motion from sheer will to pure will, from revolutionary willfulness to Kantian self-legislation). The prospect of a cheerful ending is thus not extinguished. Spirit’s and Hegel’s undertaking lives on.
9. “Disrupted Consciousness” and the Intermediate Language of Spirit
However earlier than we rush off with Hegel and discover a pleased ending in “absolute knowing” (sublating or transcending [Aufhebung] all faulty, prior levels of consciousness in an final artificial entire), allow us to pause for a second and think about a curious formulation in an earlier passage. In retrograde, we noticed, spirit discovered waystations and returned to—amongst others—“the language of spirit…which the disrupted consciousness (das zerrissene Bewuβtsein) acquires,” Hegel says. “Disrupted [torn] consciousness”? Alongside the approach, it might seem, there stays obtainable to human beings intermediate, unfinished, orphaned or remnant modes of consciousness that we’ve not merely “outgrown.” Briefly, we feature with us the modes of thought and conceptual baggage of unresolved, prior buildings of consciousness.
If then a few of us by no means fairly get past these imperfect states of “disrupted consciousness”— most of us—then these too have to be a spotlight of our inquiry. A progressive logic of spirit that retains its philosophical eye principally on the finish can be one-sided then and would have to be complemented by a philosophical pathology, if you’ll, one that appears not solely at the fulfilled finish however examines as nicely the unfulfilled levels of consciousness in all their revealing partiality. Such a “diagnostic logic” seems to be to know the residual actuality and the actual and protracted penalties of imperfect understanding (incomplete and therefore faulty levels of purpose).
Hegel, for instance, asks us to think about right here such an intermediate stage, the religious transformation that led to the brutal episode of the terror, considered one of many such sad chapters on spirit’s means. As we noticed, by transcending the limits of the private in its assent to higher universality, spirit positioned the world of the particular person human—our world—liable to “the cold steel blade.” He thereby exhibits us the have to assume higher about such transformations, particularly that of “abstract intelligence” and our potential inheritance therefrom.
Thus ought to we’ve got a Socratic second once we understand that we might not as but have reached “absolute knowing” however are ourselves someplace in-between (metazu) then what is perhaps much more essential for us to ask is the place we’re located in the midst of all this “world historical change.” In such a circumstance, The Phenomenology of Spirit, now learn additionally as a philosophical pathology, may permit us to diagnose the numerous levels of disrupted consciousness and their very actual and protracted penalties.
10. Questioning About Our Legacy
Lastly, in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Sprit, Hegel says that the dialectic of spirit is a “[high]way [Weg] of despair,” a dialectic he describes elsewhere as one “…which unsettles all particular judgments and opinions, transmuting the evil into good and good into evil.” However even when in the finish “absolute knowing” one way or the other might be thought to justify all the middleman levels, allow us to not overlook the means thereto. What then are we to conclude about this chapter, a story of an “inner spiritual revolution,” horrible and terrifying?[§3] We started by being struck by Hegel’s declare that an “inner” philosophical or religious revolution precedes and underlies the “outer” occasions of the French Revolution and that it was the unperfected stage of purpose that gave start to it and its offspring, the Reign of Terror. [§4] We adopted his improvement, from the middleman idea of “utility” to spirit’s subsequent expression as “absolute freedom.” Purpose will get an inkling that “the world is for it simply its own will” and finds itself, by the use of the enabling idea of “the general will,” as soon as once more “undivided from the whole.” Therein its more true achievement: it now “realizes itself in the work of the whole,” the place it “puts aside” its restricted individuality for the sake of dwelling universally. Freedom right here meant “freedom from particular individuality.” [§5] However then spirit encountered this paradoxical reality about itself: Spirit right here acts via people. As such “universal freedom” had no finite solution to categorical itself besides negatively. Freedom got here to imply the nihilistic removing of all of the circumstances of human particularity or as Hegel says “the fury of destruction.” In the strategy of eliminating all particularity, “human being” itself is decreased to a “mere being”—it “no longer has any content, possession, existence, or outer extension.” Human being had turn into however an empty, content-less “point” (lower than a cabbage, truly); human being had been dehumanized. Summary or absolute freedom right here takes considered one of two faulty varieties: both ideology or willfulness, both humanly detached, chilly universality or arbitrary, self-less self-assertion. [§6] Hegel formulated this troubling end result thus: “The sole [defining] work of universal freedom is death.” The consequence of the prior religious transformation of our considering, briefly, was so profound that we might not distinguish between the bloody and murderous exercise of the guillotine and the routine, every day exercise of loping off the head of a cabbage to make soup. This conceptual blindness and indiscriminateness was attainable—not due to some mass ardour or rage—however due to the imperfect “progress of spirit,” the Reign of Terror its dreadful expression. Freedom right here got here to imply the unrestraint and indiscriminateness of “abstract intelligence,” unable to differentiate between “taking a life” and “taking a sip of water.” [§7] With this “inner revolution,” the new “wisdom of the [universal] government” got here nose to nose with this reality: In having to behave in particular methods, the revolutionary authorities itself seems to be yet one more “faction” and therefore at odds with the common will. And unable to discern the true allegiance of its “citizens,” it got here to look on them with “cold, matter of fact” suspicion. All particularity is seen as a menace and so it undertakes the basic “efface[ment] of [all] distinctions” (of bourgeois individualism). The “terror of death” is right here the new face of freedom (despotism). [§8] However spirit can’t proceed thus. It should search its “substantial reality” someplace, a waystation, if not its last house. “In place of the self that it had alienated from itself,” it finds “an apportioned and limited task” as soon as once more in the realm of the specific. It realizes that “absolute freedom was a self-destroying reality,” and thus that revolution, anarchy or political absolutism are usually not the place its true achievement is to be discovered. “A new land of consciousness” awaits. Freedom there—in the land of Morality—will search to develop past its damaging which means. [§9] At this level all of us want to assume that such a darkish interval of our Western religious historical past is just previous, that we’ve one way or the other gotten past it and that we’re the higher for our having outlived and discovered about such terrifying occasions. Maybe the historic occasions are previous, however Hegel’s account makes us ponder whether the philosophical change in the construction of our considering given expression there, whether or not it too has been transcended. Or is there nonetheless a vestige of that transformation—a “disrupted consciousness”—that but shapes our considering at present?
And so the Enlightenment, that’s trendy purpose, failed us partially, Hegel exhibits, each for the historical past it left behind and the legacy it bequeathed us. Certainly it introduced us and spirit to the level of self-destruction. Freedom confirmed itself to be multiform, striving for ever higher perfection at the danger, nevertheless, of “the cold, steel blade.” Purpose had ascended to such a degree of universality that it turned “abstract intelligence,” to the level of dropping any rootedness to the precise—the particulars of our lived expertise—and to personhood—the self-identity to which we as soon as subscribed. Humanity had grow to be dehumanized.
Spirit and philosophy have, then, to assume extra about their presuppositions, their “modern principles”—how “being and thought are [to be considered] the same” (#578/352) and whether or not fact is such an summary common—lest the rarefied aircraft of their generality make our lives unintelligible and expendable, and we turn into residents of a world however of no place particularly. Spirit and philosophy, then, have their work minimize out for them.
So we ask you tonight to mirror on our trendy inheritance from the French Revolution—how our highest beliefs might probably flip into their opposites—how “liberty, equality and fraternity” might turn out to be “license, forced homogeneity and terror”–-in brief, we ask you to assume higher about the dangers of “abstract intelligence.”
And we ask you tonight to think about Hegel’s declare that sure types of purpose—certainly the very “progress of reason” and this stage of “enlightenment”—result in nihilism and terror.
And we ask you tonight as properly to assume onerous about Hegel’s distinction, implicit in the foregoing, that a revolution and not using a reformation can solely finish in blood and struggling (“the cold, steel blade”), and to wonder if and the way spirit can wash its arms clear with blood.
And we ask you tonight to marvel how the private turned so impersonal, how “human being” might be dehumanized, lowered to “mere” being-there, and to wonder if there’s nonetheless an opportunity that dignity and price may but be restored (the process of Ethical Spirit).
Lastly, we ask you to think about the hyper-generality of language and thought that we discover throughout us and to wonder if such conceptual over-reach won’t be our (“disrupted”) legacy from the Enlightenment and the way it could be offset by a extra thought-about evaluate of human being.
Considering and philosophy are good, however ….
Endnotes: This lecture was initially given at St. John’s School, Santa Fe on 2.three.16 and 11.three.17. Citations to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: the first entry in the parenthesis is Miller’s paragraph numbering, the second is the web page variety of his translation (G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977 [hereafter Phenomenology]). I want to thank my colleagues Raoni Padui and Eva Brann for his or her considerate ideas.  See revolutionary posters at the prime of this essay.  The Philosophy of Historical past, translated by J. Sibree, New York: Dover Publications, 1956, 450 [hereafter PhH]. Hannah Arendt poses the paradox of recent revolutions this manner: “…We have witnessed the supreme danger that out of the abortive attempt to found the institutions of freedom may grow the most thoroughgoing abolition of freedom and of all liberties” (“What Freedom and Revolution Really Mean,” lithub.com/never-before-published-hannah-arendt-on-what-freedom-and-revolution-really-means, 10/11, 6.27.2017, to seem in The New England Evaluate [hereafter Arendt]). This essay got here to my consideration solely after finishing this lecture. For the most half, it confirms or is confirmed by Hegel’s anticipations. My because of my brother, Barry Levine, for bringing this to me.  Philosophy of Proper, #136/108 (Hegel’s Philosophy of Proper, translated by Alan White, Newburyport, MA: Focus Philosophical Library, 2002).  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by Mansfield and Winthrop, Chicago: College of Chicago Press, 590.  Nietzsche, Zarathustra (First Half, “On the Gift-Giving Virtue,” §2).  Arendt 2/11.  John Adams thought that the prospect of a republican authorities in France was as “unnatural, irrational, and impracticable” as the panthers in Versailles (Arendt, 5/11).  Technically peasants don’t represent a category based on Marx. He thought they weren’t able to class consciousness (Appelbaum). Additionally Arendt: “No revolution, no matter how wide it opened its gates to the masses and downtrodden—les malheureux, les misérable, les damnés de la terre [the unhappy, the miserable, the damned of the earth], as we know it from the grand rhetoric of the French Revolution—was never started by them” (Arendt, four/11).  The American Framers wrestled with the pre-dialectical model of the pressure between “abstract theory (ideas)” and “effective practice (actuality).” They have been suspicious of each the summary idealism of “theoretic politicians” and the excesses of common authorities.
Hamilton: “…A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations…to presume a want of motives for such [frequent and violent] contests… [to have forgotten] that men are ambitious, vindictive and rapacious” (#6: 21) and “Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses, and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age and adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct, that we, as well as the inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?” (Madison, Jay, Hamilton, The Federalist, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 2001, #10: 25).
Madison: “Theoretic politicians who have patronized this species of government [pure democracy], have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would at the same time be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions” (#10:46)
For the Framers expertise overrode summary cause, particularly as we’d study from others’ bitter experiments (cf. Arendt, four/11: and the Framers “enthusiasm for ancient prudence”). “When a government’s form has been established for a long time and things are arranged in a certain way, it is almost always prudent to leave them alone, because the reasons for such a state having endured are often complicated and unknown, and they will cause it to maintain itself further. But when one changes the whole system, one can only remedy those difficulties that are known by theory, and one overlooks others that can only be brought to light by practice” (Montesquieu, Issues on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline, translated by David Lowenthal, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1965, 160).  Preface, Phenomenology, §29/27: “…each moment is necessary…each moment has to be lingered over.”  “…From this inner revolution there emerges the actual revolution of the actual world…” (#582/355-6). Hegel shouldn’t be distinctive in considering this. Burke earlier and Tocqueville afterwards too thought a “philosophical revolution” had preceded and ready the historic occasions. Cf. Arendt, four/11: “John Adams was entirely right when he said that ‘the revolution was effected before the war commenced.’”  The well-known Indian parable involves thoughts about blind males who every really feel a special a part of the elephant and conclude very various things about its nature.  Cf. n41.  Aesthetics, 2:1110 (cited in Kalkavage, Peter, The Logic of Want, An Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2007, 500). Additionally PhH, 452: “We have now to consider the French Revolution in its organic connection with the History of the World; for in its substantial import that event is World-Historical.”
When Hegel says in the Phenomenology that “ours is a birth time” (Preface §11/6), he nicely understands that whereas the occasions have been pregnant, some births are incomplete, even deformed. The momentousness of the second was felt by many. The 19th century, Goethe stated, “…seems to be a new era. For such great events as shook the world in the opening years of the century cannot remain without great consequence, even though the latter, like grain from seed, grow and ripen slowly” (from Gespräche, cited in Löwith, Karl, From Hegel to Nietzsche, The Revolution of Nineteenth Century Thought, translated by David Inexperienced, New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1964 , 26.) “This is the vast discovery in regard to the profoundest depths of being and freedom. The consciousness of the spiritual is not the essential basis of the political fabric, [but] philosophy [thought] has thereby become dominant: French Revolution” (PhH, 446). The emergence of thought as elementary to the progress of historical past is the constructive, if ambiguous, significance of the Enlightenment and the revolutions that adopted.  The Enlightenment “…has not arrived at the Notion found in Descartes’ metaphysics, that being and thought are, in themselves, the same; they have not [yet] arrived at the thought that being, pure being, is something concretely real but [remained for them merely] a pure abstraction…” (#578/352).  Right here we acknowledge the program embodied in Rousseau’s Social Contract. To the extent that people obey legal guidelines that they’ve authored or approved, they obey each themselves (autonomy) and are “the universal.” On this sense they’re “undivided from the whole.”  What Hegel means by “universal” must grow to be a query for us. It’s to be distinguished from “generalization,” which retains its rootedness in the actual, its connection to particulars that it seeks to embody in a workable entire (cf. Aristotle’s to katholou; Posterior Analytics II 19). In Hegel’s view, as soon as they lose their connectedness to the actual, “universals” grow to be “abstract or empty universals” and trigger us to over-generalize and mis-think.  As turned the new customized of the French Revolution (cp. Marx’ “species consciousness”)  Distinction Governor Morris’ comment, eight.9.1787: “As to those philosophical gentlemen, those Citizens of the World as they call themselves … he would not trust them. The men who can shake off [so easily] their attachments to their own country, can never love any other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices which uphold all governments” (Madison, James, Notes on the Federal Conference of 1787, New York: W.W. Norton Co, 1966, 421).  This isn’t phrase magic, a là the new rhetoric. This names a elementary conceptual transformation, not a customary phrase change.  Contemplate our trendy discomfort with the particulars of day by day life—what the ancients may need grouped beneath nomos. They’re “merely” native or specific, circumstance, place, local weather, accident, customized, nation, historical past and so forth.  Therefore the dialectical paradox: “the dreadful” turns into the means to “the good” (n25, 55). Add to this frustration at the slowness with which the dialectic works itself out and we get the instrumental rationalism of terrorism (provocative activism). (Cf. Levine, “The Senseless Course of Human Things, On “One of Professor Kant’s Most Cherished Ideas,” lecture, St. John’s School, eight.26.2005)  This displays Burke’s well-known thesis —of which Hegel appears to have been conscious—of the position of “abstraction” in distorting and exaggerating the revolution (“Reflections on the Revolution in France,” Choose Works of Edmund Burke, Vol 2, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Press, 1999).
In The Philosophy of Historical past, Hegel says “This philosophy is in the first instance only abstract thought, not the concrete comprehension of absolute truth—intellectual positions between which there is an immeasurable chasm” (446). Against this, there are “…statesmen, who from their very youth have devoted themselves to political business and have worked and lived in it…. For a general sense of particularity involves…that knowledge, experience, and facility acquired by practice, which the aristocracy devote themselves to… [and] exclusively possess. This is quite opposed to the appreciation of principles and abstract views…” (455). Such statesmen have a extra lifelike sense of what’s potential than summary thinkers. On this vein, following Tocqueville and Furet, think about Schama’s emphasis on the position of the theoretical writings of the philosophes over towards the expertise and sensible judgment of statesmen (Residents, A Chronicle of the French Revolution, New York: Classic Books, 1989). The totalistic intent is way reaching. Along with the systematic destruction of the previous (monarchy, church buildings, monuments, museums and so forth.) of the iconoclasts and the renaming of the Cathedral of Notre Dame the “Temple of Reason,” the revolution went as far as to attempt to scientifically rationalize all of human life, together with the method we stay each day, even hour by hour (a brand new division of the nation into 83 equal départments, a prohibition towards figuring out oneself with one’s regional origins in favor of the higher unity “Frenchmen” [thereafter “citizens of the world”], a brand new mode of formal tackle (“Citoyen”), a gown code, imposition of the decimal system, redivision of the yr [a new calendar], and even a renumbering of the hours in the day [a new clock]). Violations resulted in penalties. As Hegel tries to elucidate, they sought to legislate a complete revolution and never only a change in exterior varieties (“regime change”).
On this regard, contemplate Burke’s comment that the revolutionaries handled the previous regime as a overseas conqueror may, therefore the purpose the French Revolution shouldn’t be typically regarded as a “civil war.” Cf. additionally Tocqueville’s critique of France’s colonial coverage as an extension of the misguided French Revolution (“Second Letter on Algeria,” Writings on Empire and Slavery, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins College Press, 2001, 14-15, additionally 146). “The will is free only when it does not will anything alien, extrinsic, foreign to itself (for as long as it does so it is dependent), but wills itself alone—wills the will. This is absolute will—the [unrestricted] volition to be free. Will making itself its own object is the [new] basis of all right and obligation…” (PhH, 442).  “The relation of these two [alternative modes of being], since each exists indivisibly and absolutely for itself [and apart]…is one of wholly unmediated pure negation [antithesis], a negation …of the [very] individual as a being existing in the universal” (#590/360).The ironic outcome: the alienation or not-being-in-the-universal from the very summary existence sought.  Anatole France has reminded us that one formulation of the well-known banner of the revolution, forgotten for the most half, was “Liberté, équalité, et fraternité, ou la mort,” that’s “…or death.” (The Gods Will Have Blood [Les Dieux ont suif], translated by Davies, London: Penguin Books, 2004). See hooked up posters.  Cf. “The new notion of freedom, resting upon the liberation from poverty, changed both the course and goal of revolution. Liberty now comes to mean first of all ‘dress and food and the reproduction of the species,’ as the sans–culottes conspicuously distinguished their own rights from the lofty, and to them, meaningless language of the proclamation of The Rights of Man and Citizen. Compared to the urgency of their demands, all deliberations about the best form of government suddenly appears irrelevant and futile. ‘La République? La Monarchie? Je ne connais que la question sociale, [The Republic? The Monarchy? I only recognize the social question]’ said Robespierre” (Arendt, 7/11).
There follows from this a elementary distinction between political revolutions (the American Revolution) and people which are social and political revolutions (the French Revolution). Hegel’s studying that revolutions impressed by totalizing universals thus appears to anticipate Tocqueville’s and Marx’ “lessons of the 1848 revolutions.” “Only after February 1848, after ‘the great battle…between the two classes that split society, Marx noted that revolution [now had to mean] ‘the overthrown of bourgeois society,’ whereas before it [only] meant the overthrow of the form of government” (Arendt, 7/11). The logic of the enlightenment, Hegel appears to say, alone accounts for the radicalism of French Revolution as totalizing, if not totalitarian, solely to be lived out in the nineteenth century. Preface, Phenomenology, #32/32: “The life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it.”  Cp. Burke’s “the flies of summer,” (Reflections, 181). An historic aspect word: the guillotine was prized for its effectivity and its capacity to lend itself to mass manufacturing.  In a letter, Hegel says that such a flip of occasions is important. “Ghastly as the Terror was, Hegel regarded it and the whole French Revolution as necessary to spirit’s development in history. In a letter to a student, he writes, ‘Thanks to the [blood] bath of her Revolution, the French Nation has freed herself of many institutions which the human spirit had outgrown like the shoes of a child’” (Kalkavage, The Logic of Want, 502). The letter cited is to Christian Sellman, Jena, January 23, 1807. It continues: “These institutions accordingly once oppressed [France], and will continue to oppress other nations as so many [intellectual] fetters devoid of spirit” (Hegel: The Letters, translated by Butler and Seiler, Bloomington: Indiana College Press, 1984, 123). (It’s reported that Hegel used to boost a glass in commemoration of the French Revolution each July 14th.)
The editors additionally seek advice from The Philosophy of Historical past through which Hegel makes this significant distinction: “It is a false principle that the fetters which bind right and freedom can be broken without the emancipation of conscience—that there be a revolution without a reformation” (453). Additionally, “the change [in the State] was necessarily violent, because the transformation was not undertaken by the government” (446). There’s thus in Hegel’s view an ideological phantasm attribute of this stage, one which thinks it might legislate abstractly and eschew politics, particularity and follow, a stage that in consequence has no relationship to moderation and prudence. Being “pure,” one’s “principles” are “absolute,” not amenable to qualification or compromise; their “truths” thus “necessarily violent.”
Kalkavage additionally quotes Hippolyte’s remark that whereas the intent of the Phenomenology was in some sense conservative, “the advance of the dialectic is revolutionary” (Genesis and Construction of Hegel’s Phenomenology, Evanston: Northwestern College Press, 1974, 398). Cf. the” chilly metal blade” of Balzac’s story “An Episode Under the Terror”  (Honoré de Balzac, The Member of Arcis, The Seamy Aspect of Historical past and Different Tales, St. Louis: J.M. Dent and Firm, 1898, 371-389). My because of Janet Dougherty for introducing me to this revealing story. The different outstanding picture of the terror was “the lamp post” on which early victims have been hung for all to see.  Cf. “If…the goal of government was ‘the happiness of the people’—le but de la République est le bonheur du peuple—then it indeed could be provided by a sufficiently enlightened despotic government, rather than a republic.” Arendt places the paradox of the French Revolution this manner: “The French Revolution ended in a disaster [yet despite that] became a turning point in world history; the American Revolution was a triumphant success [yet] remained a local affair…. Despotism, or the return to the age of enlightened absolutism, which announced itself clearly in the course of the French Revolution, becomes the rule for almost all subsequent revolutions…and even became dominant in revolutionary theory.” And once more: “…Violence pitted against social conditions has always led to terror…. Terror let loose after the old regime has been dissolved and the new regime installed, is what either sends the revolutions to their doom or deforms them so decisively that they lapse into tyranny and despotism” (eight/11).  Lord Acton, Lectures on the French Revolution , reprint by Veritatis Splendor Publications, 2014, 315 (hereafter Lectures). My because of Walter Sterling, Sr., for introducing me to this considerate account.  See St. Simply’s “Law of Suspects” and Robespierre’s “Law of the 22nd of Prairial [June 10th].” (Lord Acton, Lectures, 311, 325). This extends as far as to incorporate even the revolution’s personal main thinkers (Danton, Robespierre, St. Simply) and has led to the adage “Revolutions devour their own children” (Vergniaud). Hegel is trying to know how this might be so.  Paradox: “The modern theory [of government]…refers everything to the individual will. But here we have no guarantee that the will in question has the right disposition which is essential to the stability of the state” (PhH, 449). “The general will” thus dangers being an unrealized, summary common and therefore humanly precarious (therefore the after killings).  The discount to arithmetical oneness—or mere quantity—is given an account right here. To say, as individuals do as we speak, that “everyone is reduced to numbers” is just to explain the outcome. It doesn’t clarify how such a bereft view of human being got here to be (cf. The Federalist, Hamilton #31: 151, Madison # 55: 288).  “Whence did [their government] emanate? Theoretically from the people…really and truly from the National Convention and its Committees. The forces now dominant are the abstract principles—freedom… [and the new notion of] virtue. This virtue has now to conduct the government in opposition to the many, whom their corruption and attachment to old interests, or a liberty that had degenerated into license, and the violence of the passions, render unfaithful to [this new] virtue” (PhH, 450). “The people” is an abstraction, Hegel appears to say. In follow solely a subset rule, those that agree with the new regime. The relaxation are made to agree (“the dictatorship of the righteous”).  Sooner or later the revolutionary councils—The Committee on Public Security particularly, the most infamous instrument of public management—didn’t even require proof. As such there’s solely “suspicion,” no demonstrated “crime.” The resultant abstract sentences of the tribunals sought to “efface” all suspected opposition or departure from the new orthodoxy, actual or not, therefore Hegel’s “a death without significance” (Kalkavach: “erasure”) (“revolutionary justice.” “nothing personal”).  The mark of a complete revolution: It seeks to regulate, not solely what one does, however now additionally what and the way one is to assume, really feel, converse, briefly be. Right here some students see the beginnings of up to date totalitarianism.  Or as Hegel says in the above talked about letter (n34), “with the change of scenery.”  Preface, #59/36 and Introduction, #79/51, Phenomenology.  A pointy distinction right here is so as between Socratic “knowledge of ignorance” and Hegelian “spiritual realization.” As Hegel illustrates above, unbeknownst to us or “behind our backs,” spirit finds expression via us and we turn into the instrument or event of spirit’s self-realization. Thus what turns into specific for Socrates stays unconsciously at work for Hegel.
Typically Hegel sees the significance of Socrates as explicitly discovering the “universal” in us and thus the particular person turns into the locus of choice (e.g. Lectures on the Historical past of Philosophy, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,  1968, 408). Nevertheless, as spirit progresses, the order of universality develops too, in line with Hegel. Therefore it isn’t the similar “universal” at work for Socrates and the philosophes.
Plato too addressed this drawback of conceptual overreach or “abstract intelligence” in the individuals of the sophists and rhetoricians (See Levine, Profound Ignorance: Plato’s Charmides and the Saving of Knowledge, Lantham, Md: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2015). “It is this fact that guides the entire series of the patterns of consciousness in their necessary sequence. But it is just this necessity itself, or the origination of the new object, that presents itself to consciousness without its understanding how this happens, which proceeds, as it were, behind the back of consciousness” (Introduction, Phenomenology, #88/56).  On this regard Hegel’s assertion of the elementary drawback of modernity:
“The manner of study in ancient times differed from that of the modern age in that the former was the proper and complete formation of the natural consciousness. Putting itself to the test at every point of existence, and philosophizing about everything it came across, it made itself into a universality that was active through and through.
In modern times, however, an individual finds the abstract form ready-made; the effort to grasp and appropriate it is more the direct driving forth of what is within and the truncated generation of the universal than it is the emergence of the latter from the concrete variety of existence. Hence the task nowadays consists not so much in purging the individual of an immediate, sensuous mode of apprehension, and making him into a substance that is an object of thought and that thinks, but rather in just the opposite in freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity so as to give actuality to the universal and impart to it spiritual life” (Phenomenology, §33/19). Additionally “Nowadays we see all value ascribed to the universal Idea is this non-actual form and the undoing of all distinct, determinate entities… allowed to pass muster as the speculative mode of treatment (§16/9). The upshot: Nowadays value is ascribed to the universal idea in its non-actual form, eclipsing distinction and determinateness, passing muster as “speculative or theoretical” thought. Cf. Hegel’s earlier formulation: “…outgrow like the shoes of a child” (n34). Concepts that aren’t assimilated (aufgehoben) in later developments develop into discardable remnants and with that the individuals of these outworn concepts, “old shoes.” Given Hegel’s critique of “abstract universals,” this picture (together with the earlier “change of scenery” picture) ought to convey us to look at the inherent “abstractness” or generality of his metaphors—and metaphors normally—and whether or not the penalties of their adoption are equally over-generalized and problematic as with different “universals.”  One is delivered to marvel about the oft quoted declare by Hegel that “The wounds of the spirit heal without leaving scars” (Phenomenology, #669/407: Die Wunden des Geistes heilen, ohne daβ Narben bleiben [without scars remaining]). The above passage appears to recommend, somewhat, that the historical past of consciousness is strewn with residual, partial and incomplete types (“intellectual fetters,” n34). In any other case spirit can be exceptional in yet one more respect, specifically its path would have left no rut, no hint, no casualty alongside the means, as if, that’s, it had no “history,” as we’d say in a non-philosophical useless. As Tocqueville knew all too properly, the historical past of the eighteenth century left scars.
Cf. Nietzsche: “Not only the reason of millennia but their madness [Wahnsinn] too breaks out in us. It is dangerous to be an heir” (Zarathustra, n65). Cf. the diagnostic morphology of political regimes [souls writ large] in Plato, The Republic, IX; additionally V.  It might thus comply with that we can’t simply decide and select our “philosophies.” Knowingly or not, we’re burdened with the remnants of previous thought all the similar, our language heavy with their “disrupted” legacies. To be a part of a tradition or custom thus means to be an heir of greater than we understand. Hegel supplies us with an event to mirror on our over-rich and amalgamated inheritance (cp. the newer notion of “[de-]sedimentation”). If certainly our language and considering are burdened with the conceptual indiscriminateness of orphaned or unrealized summary universals, one has to wonder if any effort of rethinking, can restore the concreteness and specificity of significant signification to our lived expertise.  Cp. Preface, Phenomenology, §28/16: “In [a stage of] Spirit more advanced than another, the lower concrete existence has been reduced to an inconspicuous moment; what used to be the important thing is now but a trace… advanced Spirit runs through this past…recalls them to the inward eye but has no lasting interest in them…. The single individual must pass through the formative stages…as shapes which Spirit has left behind, as stages on the way, made level with toil.” But “…the wealth of previous existence is still present to consciousness in memory (§13/7).”
Given Hegel’s developmental argument, one has to marvel, whether or not the “progress of spirit” so single-minded, so clear? And if not, whether or not such prior buildings reside solely in “memory” however remaining imperfectly assimilated “fetters,” they proceed to do their dialectical work (n34: “continue to oppress”).
On this regard additionally, see the citation of Johann Plange about the persistent “bewildering” affect of “suspended components:” “[Hegel] had no premonition of the bewildering influence which were to come upon Europe from all over the world. This is the fault of his method itself, for what dialectic had once dealt with indeed remains alive within it as a suspended component, but it never has a basically new effect in its own right.” If not “basic,” if not “new,” earlier shapes are nonetheless one way or the other “alive” (cited in Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, 133). “The road can…be regarded as the pathway of doubt, or more precisely as the way [Weg] of despair” (Introduction, Phenomenology, #77/49; Baille: “highway of despair”).  PhH, 438.  Tocqueville too thought our legacy from the French Revolution was unsettling: “This strange play whose ending is still unknown to us” (The Previous Regime and the Revolution, Quantity Two, Notes on the French Revolution and Napoleon, translated by Alan Kahan, Chicago: Chicago College Press, 2001, 186, additionally 197).  Macbeth II ii 57.  Human beings may be decreased to “mere beings” in different methods as properly, right here as a result of our summary considering is underdeveloped, and therefore we expect and converse “disruptedly” (if that may be a phrase).  Not all generalities are rules.
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Editor’s word: The featured picture is “The Storming of the Bastille” by Henry Singleton, courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.